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Recent phenomenologically influenced sociology addresses, in part,
the role of language in human activity and calls into question the
capacity of language to fully objectify social processes. In this
retrospective light the relation of language and experience
presented in George Herbert Mead's Mind, Self and Society
becomes increasingly problematic. In addition Mead's reference to
meaning as an objective phenomenon and his conception of the
"generalized other" bear re-examination.
This paper has a rather limited and circumscribed goal-to render
explicit Mead's treatment of language and meaning in Mind, Self
and Society and to briefly discuss some of the difficulties inherent
in this aspect of his work. Of particular concern is the possibility
that Mead may have understressed the precategorical dimension 1
of human behavior and, consequently, despite some reference to
unconsciously generated actions of human beings, placed a
perhaps excessive emphasis upon rational and conscious activity.
This discussion, however, does not take place in a vacuum
apart from recent sociological concerns. Currently, for instance,
ethnomethodology has explicitly focused on the taken-for-granted
"background expectancies" or "interpretive procedures" which
underlie and make possible a sense of social order. Central to this
perspective is the idea that the fit between social norms ("surface
rules") and situational action is "managed" through tacit reliance
on interpretive procedures ("basic" or "deep structure" rules). As
a consequence the relationship of widely shared norms and values
*This paper has benefited from comments by ] onathan Goldberg, ] ay Corzine
and anonymous MARS referees.
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to concrete settings becomes problematic. Likewise the notion of
meaninz shared by a linguistic community gives way to a focus
upon c~ntext-dependentand ineluctably "indexical" meaning.
A prime interest of ethnomethodology in exploring the
commonsense world is in natural language. · · · If language is basic
to the social process of meaning-constitution then new ways of
exploring the acquisition of language, and through it a sense of
social structure, and situated language use must be developed.
Unlike the linguist the sociologist does not posit some kind of
"ideal speaker-hearer" whose language use is context-free, but
rather focuses on the context-bound contingencies of actual
language (Phillipson, 1972:140-1).
Ultimately, however, from this vantage point certain of .Mead's
statements in Mind, Self and Society with respect to meanmg and
language stand out in a newly pr~bl~~atic light. In p~ticular
Mead's conception of language as slgI1lfl~ant symb?ls wh~ch call
out the same meaning for an entire SOCIal group, 15 particularly
conspicuous.
Language is, of course, central to Mead's "symb~lic
interactionism.T' It is the use of significant symbols which
primarily marks the distinction between animals and human
beings. Moreover, it is t~e capacity of language to e~o~e s~ared
aspects of experience which forms the very ground of Mmd. and
"Self." In effect, Mind does not exist apart from symbolIcally
indexed meanings and likewise Self is substantially constituted
through the objectifying properties of language.
Nevertheless, Mead at times goes to great length to stress that
"meaning" is an objective phenomenon rooted in a social process
f . "Aexisting prior to and apart rom conSCIousness: w~en~ss or
consciousness is not necessary to the presence of meaning In the
process of social experience" (Mead, 1~~4:77). Thu~ social
processes and social action are a precorrdit.ion of consciousness
rather than the other way around. The fact, moreover, that the
behavior of non-human animals is seen, by Mead, to be meaningful
is further evidence of the initial separation of meaning from
consciousness or verbalization: " ... the chick's response to the
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cluck Gf the mother hen is a response to the meaning of the cluck;
the cluck refers to danger or to food, as the case may be, and has
this meaning or connotation for the chick" (1934:77).
Along these same lines, Mead at times refers to meaning as
existing apart from explicit human awareness during the course of
a given activity. It is, consequently, often only in retrospect that
we can pick out and identify the meaning our actions hold.
Remember, for example, Mead's anecdotal account of the
absent-minded college professor who intended to dress for dinner
but ended up in pajamas in bed: "A certain process of undressing
was started and carried out mechanically; he did not recognize the
meaning of what he was doing" (1934:72). Similarly, at points
throughout Mind, Self and Society Mead calls attention to human
activity which takes place almost automatically in the course of
everyday life:
We are more or less unconsciously seeing ourselves as others see us.
We are unconsciously addressing ourselves as others address us; in
the same way as the sparrow takes up the note of the canary we
pick up the dialects about us.... We are unconsciously putting
ourselves in the place of others and acting as others act
(1934:68-9).
... there is something involved in our statement of the meaning of
an object which is more than mere response, however complex
that may be. We may respond to a musical phrase and there may be
nothing in the experience beyond the response; we may not be able
to say why we respond or what it is we respond to.... Most of our
processes of recognition do not involve this identification of the
characters which enable us to identify the objects (1934:91).
In short, George Herbert Mead by no means overlooks the
existence of a preverbal dimension of human activity. Nonetheless,
this is an area of concern to which Mead did not give primacy. In.
part the reason for this lies with Mead's thoroughgoing project to
distinguish between "animal" and "human being." Mead's critique
of Watson's behaviorism, for example, rests substantially on the
grounds that human activity is qualitatively different from animal
behavior. Whereas in some sense one may locate the causes of
animal behavior in the environment, the well springs of human
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activity are selected (not merely reactive) resp~nses ~riginating.in
the individual organization of the act. Thus, while anIm~ behavior
may be studied apart from consciousness, human behavior by and
large cannot. In essence, then, for Mead to stress th~ tacit,
unconscious aspect of human activity would undermine t.he
fundamental distinction between animal and human behavior
upon which he builds. 3
Specifically, the use of significant, symbols marks ,the
definitive separation, for Mead, between animal and huma~ bemg.
The existence of language as a partially autonomous entrty :hus
allows the capacity to control, direct and to evoke behavioral
responses:
It is, of course, the great value, or one of the great values of
language that it does give us control over the organization of the
act ... but it is important to recognize that that to which the word
refers is something that can lie in the experience of the individual
without the use of language itself. Language does pick out and
organize this content in experience (1934:13).
The central difference, for Mead, between "gestures" and
"significant symbols" is that gestures trigger a response in animals
but do not call out a substantially similar response as does
language in human beings. The existence, therefore, of.signific~t
symbols which callout the same meaning not only ~~r mteracnng
individuals but for an entire linguistic commumty allows an
extended human capacity to control social interaction (1934:46).
In all of this two of Mead's points are Vitally important for
the purposes of this discussion. The first is that words withi~.a
given community of discourse come to stand for the same specific
response: " ... every gesture comes within a given social group ~r
community to stand for a particular act or response . · · and this
particular act or response for which it stands is its meaning as a
significant symbol" (1934:47). Secondly, moreover, language has
the facility to pick out the objective meaning in experience:
"Meaning can be described, accounted for, or stated in terms of
symbols or language ... but language simply lifts out of the social
process a situation which is logically or implicitly there already"
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(1934:79). Mead thus attributes to language considerable capacity
to capture and objectify the underpinnings of human activity. In
this vein Mead highlights the ability of human beings to explicitly
verbalize (and thereby control) factors underlying unconsciously
operative practices. For example, again drawing on the
comparative distinction between animals and human beings,
" ... the intelligence of the detective over against the intelligence
of the bloodhound lies in this capacity to indicate what the
particular characters are which will callout his response of taking
the man" (1934: 93). In other words, the subtle, cued responses
and the tacit skills which underlie human abilities can be made
explicit. Human beings can thereby consciously direct future
activity and are not at the mercy of animal-like preverbal
capacities.
The latter point is integral to Mead's philosophy but serves to
distinguish him in some measure from those today who, in a
phenomenological or ethonmethodological idiom, give emphasis to
the fundamental importance of unspoken, tacit abilities and
background assumptions. This is a difference of degree and should
not be overdrawn. Nonetheless a strong underlying tenet of recent
social phenomenology is that we know more than we can say: "We
know more than we can tell and we can tell nothing without
relying on our awareness of things we may not be able to tell"
(Polanyi, 1964:x).4 Embedded in this notion is the idea that we
may not be able to exhaustively capture and make explicit the
general premises or situationally response features of our behavior.
In some forms this stress upon an ineffables aspect of human
behavior has strongly irrationalist connotations in so far as it calls
into question the capacity to rationally and consciously direct the
course of behavior. But certainly this conception renders
problematic the capacity of language to simply represent the
"meaning" of human activity" -a meaning which in Mead's vision
is objective and can be shared by an entire community of
discourse. At issue here is the extent to which the meaning of
terms or explicit rules is inevitably dependent on their interpreted
and negotiated use in concrete situations. In ethnomethodological
parlance such concerns are associated with the "indexical" nature
of expression and with the "essential incompleteness" of explicit
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rules. As Mehan and Wood unequivocally assert: " ... all symbolic
forms (rules, linguistic utterances, gestures, actions) carry a fringe
of incompleteness that may be filled in and filled in differently
everytime they occur" (1975:90).
Again the difference is relative and not absolute but Mead
clearly places more emphasis not only on the universality of
meaning but on the capacity of language to circumscribe and
objectify that meaning. Mead was, of course, well aware that
language is invariably rooted in the practice and conventions of a
given social group-but how extensive a social group? Mead does at
times seem to trace widely-shared meaning from its initial mutual
recognition by interacting individuals, yet he clearly indicates that
our capacity for "taking the attitude of the other" eventually
crystallizes in an attitude shared by the entire community-i.e.,
the "generalized other." The key question which remains,
however, is the extent to which language is, in fact, irrevocably
embedded in micro- (not society-wide) group practice and thus has
strictly limited scope.
Surely human beings qua human beings living and acting in
the same physical world do share a fundamental physiological
commonality upon which the possibility of intersubjective
understanding rests. Nonetheless, there are certainly
setting-specific and esoteric "meanings" which cannot be evoked
and represented without having shared highly specific experiences.
Language, in this sense, does not enable an exhaustive access to
experience; it can only and primarily serve as a heuristic guide to
that which is already understood or which comes to be tacitly
implied in the use of words in a given context and in light of
specific practices:
Maxims are rules, the correct application of which is part of the art
they govern. The true maxims of golfing or of poetry increase our
insight into golfing or poetry and may even give valuable guidance
to golfers and poets; but these maxims would instantly condemn
themselves to absurdity if they tried to replace the golfer's skill or
the poet's art. Maxims cannot be understood, still less applied by
anyone not already possessing a good practical knowledge of the
art. They derive their interest from our appreciation of the art and
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cannot themselves either replace or establish that appreciation.
Another person may use scientific maxims for the guidance of
his inductive inference and yet come to quite different conclusions
(Polanyi, 1964:31).
The point is that we can verbalize rules applicable to a given
circumstance and practice but nevertheless be unable to effectively
use those explicit rules to successfully accomplish the practice; the
converse is not true, for one can know the practice and not be able
to verbalize the explicit rules. In fact it may be said that "the aim
of a skillful performance is achieved by the observation of a set of
rules which are not known as such to the person following them"
(Polanyi, 1964:49). Again, words or explicit rules have a
restricted ability to evoke a shared or appropriate response if those
words are not already rooted in practice and if the specific sense
of the words has not been built up over time.
With respect to any art, technical ability or discipline,
verbalization plays a central role in singling out certain aspects of
reality as both significant and real. But language itself is rooted in
practice and invariably carries with it a preverbal "fringe" which
cannot be fully and effectively specified. In short, practice is
indexed by language but cannot be fully represented by reference
to concepts or explicit rules. Kuhn, for example, in his discussion
of paradigms suggest that doing the same exemplary problems
imparts a tacit ability to see the world in the same way as other
specialists working under the auspices of the same paradigm and
having worked through the same concrete puzzle solutions. Thus
" ... doing problems is learning the language of a theory and
acquiring the knowledge of nature embedded in that language"
(1970:272). The point is, however, that a particular conception of
nature is not intrinsically given in language but is rather embedded
in the relationship between language and practice. A sublinguistic
gestalt is thus implied by a specific use language but may only be
shared by those who have learned to attach reality to particular
verbalizations in concrete ways.
Language, then, may be seen as a quasi-autonomous realm
which can, in some measure, control, direct and evoke shared
aspects of experience. But language and verbalization rest upon
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and cannot exhaust a tacit, preverbal ability to see and deal with
the world. Consequently this primacy of the unspoken must lead
us to re-examine the relationship of language to experience and
practice in general. One possibility (albeit extreme) is that verbal
formulation bears little relation to practice which such
verbalization allegedly directs: "A scientist can accept, therefore,
the most inadequate and misleading formulation of his own
scientific principles without ever realizing what is being said,
because he automatically supplements it by his tacit knowledge of
what science really is, and thus makes the formulation ring true"
(Polanyi, 1964:169).
Mead certainly makes some room for a tacit,
taken-for-granted world. Yet he surely casts his lot with the
capacity of language to effectively reconstruct and facilitate
rational control of human endeavors on the basis of objective
experiences accessible to human beings generally (or at least
within the confines of one society). An admirable vision perhaps,
it is nonetheless a conviction which bears critical inspection. The
richness of Mead's thought lies in his willingness to recognize and
take into account the complex grounds of human activity. One
aspect of this is his treatment of the relation between conscious
and unconscious, articulate and tacit domains. But the role of
partially autonomous language and the issue of the conscious
control of activity facilitated by language rest on a questionable
notion of the relation of language to experience. Consequently, it
is incumbent to ask how interrelated language and practice
actually are. How much ability to control, direct and objectify
activity does language in fact afford? What capacity does language
have to create intersubjective agreement through taking the
attitude of the other apart from quite specific common
experience?
Surely these are not readily answerable questions but they
nonetheless raise issues of vital significance for contemporary
sociological inquiry. In part the tasks of sociology would be far
simpler if we did indeed inhabit a Meadian world where the
objective meaning of social phenomena was not only widely
accessible but readily and non-problematically transcribable. The
questionable relation of language to experience, however,
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concommitantly raises the possibility that we cannot take for
granted the consistent use of sociological terms and concepts apart
from the specific occasion of their employment:
Ethnomethodology, through its concern with language, also draws
attention to the limitations that the problematic character of
language itself imposes on the kinds of interpretations or accounts
sociology can offer of the social world. The 'objectivity' of
sociological accounts becomes problematic when the implications
of couching theory in language are examined. A theory or
interpretation based upon empirical investigation is always a
negotiated theory ... (Phillipson, 1972:141).
In summary, then, the re-examination of the relation
between language and experience in Mind, Self and Society in light
of the core concerns of ethnomethodology raises some thorny
questions. It is not by any means claimed here that the issues are
resolvable by wholesale adoption of an ethnomethodological
program. Nor is it the intention of this paper to generate, strictly
speaking, a comparison of Meadian philosophy with
ethnomethods," The root issue is the objectifying property
attributed to language in Mind, Self and Society alone. It is
somewhat inevitable, however, that such discussion implicitly
broaches other questions and casts a shadow on other Meadian
conceptions. In particular Mead's concept of the "generalized
other" inextricably and heavily rests on the idea of meaning as
objective and widely sharable via the medium of language. The
notion of "taking the attitude of the other" through the aid of
significant symbols is not by any means necessarily incompatible
with the notion of situated meaning. Nonetheless the idea of a
generalized other or " ... the attainment of a universal human
society ... such that all social meanings would each be similarly
reflected in ... respective individual
consciousnesses ... "(1934-310) seems, in current sociological
context, considerably less tenable.
The impact of the ethnomethodological concern with
context-sensitive and indexical meaning almost inevitably
transforms societal order into a setting-specific order. Moreover, if
25
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we cannot adequately through words represent concrete
experience or practice but must, to grasp the sense of those words,
undergo a highly similar experience not only are the limits of
language manifest but the notion of community based on shared
meaning likewise becomes palpably problematic. Ultimately, not
only is the Meadian relation of language and experience
questionable but the feasibility of the "generalized other" and
Mead's vision of an ideal human community also bear rethinking.
NOTES
1. I use "precategorical dimension" (and in other places "preverbal") to
refer to that unconscious or preconscious domain of human abilities,
activity, skills and practices which is ordinarily taken-for-granted (not
made explicit) and which is in some measure ineffable (not fully
specifiable in words).
2. Mead did not, of course, refer to his work as "symbolic interaction" as is
common today following Herbert Blumer. "Social Behaviorism"
probably more closely represents Mead's own self understanding.
Nonetheless, given that the bulk of Mead's published work (including
Mind, Self and Society) is an edited transcription of lecture notes even
that reference may be questionable. Natanson (1973:1-4), for example,
suggests that Charles Morris as the editor of much of Mind, Self and
Society is largely responsible for Mead being termed a "social
behaviorist."
5.
6.
that a version of this premise pervades ethnomethodology generally can
be gleaned from a reading of Mehan and Wood (1975) especially Chapter
Four "Reality as a Rules System." For the purposes of my discussion I
rely heavily on Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge believing that he
articulates clearly and forcefully what much ethnomethodology leaves
less than fully explicit.
"Ineffable," as use it, refers generally to the intrinsic
nontranscribability of certain tacit skills, practices and experience into
language. While there are likely purely individual private experiences
which do not lend themselves to verbalization, a central premise of this
paper is that there also exist tacit practices and .skills which are
nevertheless, in some sense, held in common-si.e., by individuals acting
upon and interpreting the world in ways which render (for all practical
purposes) the same results. One instance of this might be natural
scientists working under the auspices of the same paradigm. While their
common endeavor may be indexed by words and symbols there are
unspoken understandings and presuppositions which remain
un articulated and embedded in the practice of doing science.
Compare Mead's positron, for example, with Cicourel's discussion of
"indefinite triangulation" (1974: 124) and with the essay on cross-modal
communication where, for instance, Cicourel notes that "oral
descriptions ... of visual-kinesic information always presuppose
unstated assumptions and meaning that cannot be clearly objectified for
someone who has not experienced the setting" (1974: 158).
3. This raises interesting problems for those purists who would wish to
sharply distinguish behaviorist from phenomenological concerns, for
there is at least some convergence between the tacit, precategorical
dimension on the one hand, and instinctive and conditioned behavior,
on the other.
4. This idea, is, I would argue, integral to an understanding of
ethnomethodology and related approaches. One finds it most explicitly
stated in Cicourel (1974) in the essay "Ethnomethodology." A sense
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7. Many ethnomethodologists do point to certain similarities with Mead.
For example the "I" (as opposed to the "Me") coincides in large
measure with the interpretationist emphasis of ethnomethods (see
Cicourel, 1974:13-4) as does Blumer's strongly interpretationist
rendering of Mead. It is interesting to note that on occasion when
ethnomethodology/phenomenology draws on Mead it is the "late" Mead
of The Philosophy of the Present which is salient. McHugh (1968), for
example, adapts Mead's treatment of "emergence" and "relativity." In a
related vein Natanson (1973), who attempts to document Mead's
intellectual journey away from "behaviorism," sees Mead's approach to
phenomenology as culminating in The Philosophy of the Present. For a
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brief synopsis of ethnomethodological differences with Mead see
Zimmerman and Pollner (1970:101-2).
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AN EXAMINATION OF THE
CONCEPT "SOCIAL SOLIDARITY"
Art Evans
Kansas State University
Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1977, Vol. 2 No. 1:29-46
Although Durkheim's original definition of social solidarity
included both beliefs and practices, modem sociologists have
empirically operationalized the concept in terms of only beliefs or
only practices. It is suggested that the modern conceptualization of
social solidarity is invalid because it does not allow the researcher
to get close to empirical reality.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the concept "social solidarity." This
writer feels that social solidarity has been misused by many
sociologists and cast into a framework unfamiliar to Durkheim's
definition. It is further proposed that this concept is useless when
defined and put into operation.
For example, one must be very careful to note that the term
does not imply the same meaning for micro and macro
sociologists. Combining this with the fact that micro and macro
sociologists often disagree about their own definitions of social
solidarity seems to make this concept more complex. Thus, before
any more empirical studies are done in this area, it seems
reasonable to clarify this concept. In the pages that follow, an
attempt is made to define social solidarity as used by Durkheim,
to examine how sociologists used the concept and to suggest that
there is a need to recast our definitions in terms which include
both belief and practice.
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